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Recent Decisions
MARYLAND, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, PENNSYLVANIA, AND VIRGINIA

D.C. Adopts
New Test For
Insanity
Defense
by John Jeffrey Ross

On June 29, 1971, Eddie Bethea ended
his marriage in a straightforward manner
by shooting his wife five times. He was
brought to trial before the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia and convicted
of first degree murder after an unsuccessful insanity defense.
A panel of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction,
Bethea I). United States, 365 A.2d 64
(D.C. App. 1976), in one of the more significant decisions handed down by that
court within the past year. While refusing
to hold that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the American Law Institute's standard for the insanity defense
as adopted by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in United States I). Brawner, 153
8.S.App.D.C. 1, 471 F.2d 969 (1972)
(See MODEL PENAL CODE §4.01), the District of Columbia .Court of Appeals
adopted prospectively the All standard
for trials in the District of Columbia
Superior Court from the date of the
Bethea decision. Howev!'!r, the Court of
Appeals refused to approve the
"diminished capacity" theory expressed
in Brawner. In addition, the court rejected
Bethea's contention that the lower court
erred in refusing to instruct the jury that
the government had the burden of proving
the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.

~

THE FORUM

THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Crucial to understanding the disposition of the first issue (involving the Court
of Appeals' treatment of the federal circuit
ruling in Brawner) is an appreciation of
the unique judicial environment of the
District of Columbia and of the District of
Columbia Court Reform and Criminal
Procedure Act of 1970, 83 Stat. 473
("Court Reorganization Act.")
There are two separate court systems in
the District of Columbia. The first is the
familiar federal trial and appellate court
structure with a United States District
Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Parallel to this is the local District of Columbia system with the Superior Court
and Court of Appeals. Judges in the latter
courts exercise general jurisdiction over
local matters and are equivalent to the
judiciary in state courts. The confusion
between the two systems can be exaggerated because the United States articulates
its concern for law and order in the District of Columbia through the District of
Columbia Code, and the United States Attorney has the responsibility for the
prosecution of all major local criminal
cases in the Superior Court. As in all
federal districts, violations of federal law
are prosecuted in the United States District Court.
Before the Court Reorganization Act
took effect on February 1, 1971, there
were numerous trial courts of limited jurisdiction which administered District of
Columbia law, generally misdemeanors,
while felonies were the province of the
U.S. District Court. These "municipal"
courts were subject to review by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which
in turn acted as an intermediate appellate
court for the U.S. Court of Appeals for
this circuit. Decisions of the federal court
of appeals were thus the case law for the
District of Columbia and binding on the

trial courts of both systems. The Court
Reorganization Act then consolidated the
various municipal trial courts into one
District of Columbia Superior Court, and
the D.C. Court of Appeals was elevated to
the status of "court of last resort" for
Washington, D.C. and became equal to
the highest court of a state. After the Act's
effective date of February 1, 1971, decisions of the United States Circuit Court
no longer constitute the case law of the
District of Columbia although they will be
treated "with great respect." M.A.P. I).
Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. App.
1971). See generally, Swain I). Pressley,
97 S.Ct. 1224, 1226 (1977).
In the appeal of his murder conviction,
Bethea argued that the trial court was incorrect in charging the jury on the insanity formulation enunciated by the
United States Court of Appeals in Durham
I). United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 228,
214 F.2d 862 (1954) when that standard
had been abandoned by the same circuit
court in United States I). Brawner, 153
U.S. App.D.C. 1, 471 F.2d 969 (1972). In
rejecting this argument, the Court of Appeals noted that because Brawner was
decided after the effective date of the

Court Reorganization Act, Durham remained the law in the District of Columbia at the time of Bethea's trial. The court
stated that the Act granted jurisprudential
independence to the District of Columbia courts and that the United States
Court of Appeals should not have the
authority "to control the development of
[D.C.] law indirectly by altering the roots
from which it has evolved." Bethea v.
United States, 365 A.2d at 71.

INSANITY STANDARDS
The disease-product insanity standard
announced in Durham was succinctly
stated by Judge Bazelon: "[A]n accused is
not criminally responsible if his unlawful
act was the product of mental disease or
mental defect." 94 U.S.App.D.C. 228,
240-241, 214 F.2d 862, 874-875.
An advance over the "knowledge of
right from wrong" test (M'Naghten's
Case, 8 Eng.Rep. 718 [1843]) and "irresistable impulse" standard (see Smith v.
United States, 59 U.S.App.D.C. 144, 36
F.2d 548 [1929]), the Durham rule was
more consonant with the modern level of
psychological theory. This standard was
nonetheless criticized in Bethea as "subject to a misinterpretation as prescribing a
diagnostic, rather than a moral or societal
test." 365 A.2d at 74. The linear, direct
relationship between disease and product
in the Durham paradigm could well be interpreted to include the criminal act within the mental disease rather than characterizing the mental state as the
phenomenon affecting moral and legal
responsibility for that act. The court in
Bethea joined other authorities in recognizing that the disease-product doctrine
"had the ultimate practical effect of shifting resolution of the ultimate issue from
the jury to the expert witnesses." 365
A.2d at 74 (emphasis supplied). Evidence
on the behaviorial dysfunction could well
be mistaken by the jury (under a diseaseproduct instruction) as conclusive
testimony on the product-the criminal
act. In this regard, the medical testimony
of an expert witness would constitute a
fait accompli, effectively settling the issue
of criminal responsibility and displacing
the jury from its consideration of the ultimate issue.

The following standard has thus been
adopted for the courts in the District of
Columbia:

between individual criminal defendants
the nature and development of their
mental capabilities may vary greatly.

1 A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the at the time of such
conduct as a result of a mental disease
or defect she lacked substantial
capacity either to recognize the
wrongfulness of her conduct or to conform her conduct to the requirements
of law.

, 365 A.2d at 87-88.
The law will allow admission of objectively demonstrable evidence such as that
of intoxication to indicate a diminished
intent, as such criminal intent is inferred
from factual circumstances, and the lay
jury need not consider any but objective
facts in making this decision. On the other
hand, psychiatric evidence deals with the
"subjective" nature of the criminal mind,
and this esoteric testimony has been held
to lack the sufficient probative value necessary for the jury to reach a conclusion
free of prejudice or undue technical persuasion.
A further concern of the court was that
while the consequence of a successful insanity defense is therapeutic confinement
(see 24 D.C.Code §§301[d] and [ell, an
acquittal by a jury impressed by technical
evidence admitted to explain criminal intent in subjective terms results in freedom
for an accused who would otherwise be
found guilty by traditional standards.

~,As

used in this standard, the terms
mental disease or defect" do not include an abnormality manifested only
by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
365A.2d at 79.
Despite the abandonment of the
Durham disease-product standard, the
court found that Bethea had not been prejudiced by its application at trial, noting
that the accused-appellant had been examined under both the Durham and ALI
(Brawner) criteria in pretrial tests and that
the trial court provided the jury with
"guidance as to Durham's troublesome
productivity construction." 365 A.2d at
97.

DIMINISHED CAPACITY
REJECTED
The court also rejected the appellant's
argument that evidence bearing on the
question of insanity should also be used
by the jury to consider the issues of "premeditation, deliberation, and malice."
365 A.2d at 83. The use of psychiatric
testimony to indicate a defendant's mental capacity sufficiently diminished to
preclude the necessary guilty mind or intent was sanctioned by the circuit court in
United States v. Brawner, 153 U.S. App.
D.C., at 30-34, 371 F.2d at 998-1002.
The Bethea court concluded that
although psychiatric testimony is logically
relevant to the issue of mens rea, the traditional legal conception that all persons
are capable of forming the same level of
criminal intent does not permit a graduated scale of that intent as might be demonstrated, in theory, by psychiatric evidenc~. In following this traditional policy,
the court stated:
Within the range of individuals-who are
not 'insane', the law does not recognize
the readily demonstrable' fad'that as
-,

INSANITY: BURDEN OF PROOF
The third major issue facing the court
was whether the requirement that the accused must establish his insanity defense
by a preponderance of the evidence, pursuant to 24 D.C.Code §301 (j), was constitutionally offensive.
By resolving this issue in favor of the
government, the court stated that this
burden of proof continues to be acceptable in the face of Mullany v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684 (1975) because the issue of insanity is to be considered by the trier of
fact after the government proves all of the
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 365 A.2d at 94. As authority,
the court relied on Leland v. Oregon, 343
U.S. 790 (1952) where an Oregon statute
requiring the accused to establish his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt withstood a constitutional challenge. See
Mullany v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 705
(concurring opinion by Justice Rehnquist); see also, Patterson v. New York,
97 S.Ct. 2319 (1977).
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